A Timeline and Analysis of Ransomware Attacks During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated

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Word Count: XXXX

February 27, 2022

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Abstract

Ransomware is a type of malware designed to access, block, and encrypt the victim’s personal data until a request is fulfilled. With the estimated average global damage of ransomware increasing from $8 billion in 2018 to $20 billion in 2020 it is not a surprise that there was a significant increase in the number, complexity, and severity of attacks during the COVID-19 pandemic despite the technology only being ~33 years old. The aim of this project was to research all ransomware attacks during the COVID-19 timeline using various news and scientific research outlets to ensure validity and correlate them to a visual timeline of attacks. These statistics are then used to identity trends and patterns in attacks related to significant COVID-19 dates. Being the first pandemic since the invention of the internet, the results of this investigation will provide insight into both human and ransomware behaviour for future pandemics.

This paper aims to display and analysis these attacks from a COVID-19 perspective as well as highlights the vital importance of analysing such a pandemic for future cyber security. I have found that there was a large amount and grouping of attacks in certain sectors such as Government (41), Education (48), Technology (54), and Healthcare (58). This compared to other sectors such as Retail (16) and Services (19) possibly show a focus on these sectors. One reason for this targeting could be to acquire and disrupt valuable Covid-19 research as well as exploit new vulnerabilities created by remote learning. There are also very distinct bunches of attacks in these sectors such September 2020 – December 2020 which seem to coincide with noticeable Covid-19 news and dates. There was a noticeable increase in the use of “double extortion” tactics by ransomware groups [14] such as Ryuk causing a 178% in ransom pay-outs. Finally, one interesting observation is that certain ransomware gangs such as Ragnarok [15], Avaddon [16], Darkside [17], and noticeably Maze emerged and shut down during the Covid-19 timeframe.

Keywords include: Coronavirus, COVID-19, Ransomware, Cyber Security, Cyber-Criminals.

1. Introduction

Ransomware is a form of malware that uses encryption to hold a victim’s information/systems at ransom and only allowing them to be encrypted once a request (usually a ransom demand) is fulfilled. Whilst not the most prominent form of cyber-attack, it is the most prominent and destructive form of malware to date despite the technology being comparatively recent as has been on the rise for some time before being expedited during the pandemic. The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) is a pandemic that has been a global crisis event since late 2019 and whilst subsided is still ongoing, affecting the social-economic environment. This has resulted in lifestyle changes for 100’s of millions of citizens across numerous countries around the world. According to recent statistics from the World Health Organisation (WHO) Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard reported 430.3 million confirmed cases and ~5.9 million deaths globally [18]. However, it has also had a profound secondary effect on the technology we rely on as cyber-criminals have found exploits in new uses of technology to support lockdown and other changes.

Since the outbreak and subsequent lockdown there have been numerous reports of breaches in security in student online learning platforms with 50 in the US alone in 2020 [3].These attacks been made possible due to an increase in reliance in technology but being unable to service remote devices to ensure security standards are maintained. Furthermore, devices used during home learning using untrusted home networks are returned to their school infecting existing systems and allowing for vulnerabilities that can be exploited when the school is most vulnerable during term time or holidays, overall, the resiliency and security of the education technology ecosystem has been severely tested.

Working at home has also become commonplace and raised a new level of cyber security challenges for an already crippled industries and citizens. Ransomware gangs have been able to use both old and new tactics to exploit new vulnerabilities to the point that 64% of people in the US are willing to pay to regain access to their data to elevate the heightened stress, anxiety and worry already facing individuals [20]. Companies and software vendors themselves also were predominantly blindsided with the demand and security of product further exasperating these problems; something that groups such as Sodinokibi and Maze exploited.

Despite promises from various groups such as Maze and DopplePaymer promising to not attack critical COVID-19 related industries [21] various ransomware attacks have been seen on various healthcare facilities and COVID-19 research information [24] the value and time criticality of this information makes it an appealing target as well as further solidifies the chance of payment. In response to this increased threat the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) released an advisory on how to mitigate malware and ransomware attacks [22]. This discusses the definition of ransomware along with strategies, actions, and prevention methods to reduce the impact of the infection. In addition, a timeline of cybercrimes has been produced displaying various cyber-attacks in the UK related to COVID-19[23]. However, both lack a broader range of attacks related to the pandemic globally, with most attacks going unnoticed and being dispersed and sporadically reported by governments, media, incident teams and occasionally scientific journals it is extremely challenging to find a holistic global viewpoint of ransomware attacks and the effects these and the pandemic have on one another. This hinders the ability for governments and organisations to successfully develop appropriate mitigation and protection methods for the current and future environment.

In this paper I aim to support ongoing research by expanding the search worldwide and present them in a series of visuals to create a dashboard showing a simple timeline of events. This and subsequent analysis are useful as it allows us to view 18 months of the pandemic and the attacks that occurred throughout in an understandable and informative format allowing us to identify current trends and tactics used by cyber gangs; providing an insight on how they may react in the future and thus providing us information to respond effectively if such circumstances happen again.

The scatterplot maps various ransomware attacks over the months in order to show a chronological example of coordinated groups of attacks around the announcement of key global COVID-19 dates, in addition it also maps the attacks to the sectors and countries affected in order to show how the pandemic has influenced the aims of attackers and what is deemed enticing to attack. We expand this scatterplot to focus on specific attacks and their impact both locally and globally. This is complimented with additional information on the different types of cyber gangs to analyse the behaviour of these gangs and to see what their aims may be. To compliment these analyses, we reflect on the broader impact of these attacks for each country how they have affected COVID-19 research, jobs in their respective sector and how the workforce in these sectors may still be at risk. The chronological nature of the scatterplots well as the clear correlations the other diagrams provide a chronological sequence of attacks and reveal the aims of cyber-criminal gangs during the pandemic. This provides an excellent foundation to build upon with further research whilst standing by itself as a comprehensive piece of literature.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the background and functionality of ransomware and why it is used for malicious practises, I then reflect upon notable ransomware attacks in Section 3 and how they have emerged due to past incidents. In Section 4 I discuss the requirements of this project as well as present our global COVID-19 dashboard visuals followed by an analysis and broader reflection of these attacks. Section 5 will be used to discuss the impacts of attacks on the population working from home as well as the wider technology and COVID-19 research risk.

1. Background

To guide my understanding and analysis it was vital to understand the basic theory and applications of ransomware as well as wider cybercrime topics. This will also provide a foundation of knowledge to support understanding of this paper as well as allows us to define how complex and impactful ransomware has been during the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to their being various but no universally accepted model related to attacks and cyber-crimes [25, 26, 27], I relied on the UK’s Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) categorisation of cybercrime [28]




Figure 1 - Cyber-dependent and cyber enabled crimes (focused on cyber dependent crimes) [28]

Ransomware is categorised under cyber-dependant crimes. Cyber-dependant crime is defined as an offence “*that can be committed only through the use of Information and Communications Technology (‘ICT’) devices, where the devices are both the tool for committing the crime, and the target of the crime*”[28]. Ransomware is defined as “*a form of malicious software that infiltrates a computer or network and limits or restricts access to critical data by encrypting files until a ransom is paid.*”[29]. It attacks a system by being downloaded onto systems via spam mail and RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) attacks, or dropped as a payload by other malware into vulnerable systems. Once executed, ransomware can either lock a computers functions or in the case of crypto ransomware such as CryptoLocker [30] encrypts predetermined files (typically SQL, CAD and tax related files) using an encryption key (e.g. AES [31, 32], RSA [33]) and presents a screen image displaying their demands preventing the user from using their system and access to potentially critical files. This intimidation is why ransomware is known as ‘scareware’ [34].

Observations have shown that the pandemic has coincided with two evolutions in modern ransomware; Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) and double extortion. RaaS is a form of ransomware developed by a criminal group to be sold to anonymous affiliates with little technical knowledge in return for a share of the profits. The aim of this is to increase the range the ransomware can be used and by the amount of people dramatically increasing the scope of attacks which with new exploitations due to changes caused by the pandemic (remote learning/working etc.) is extremely beneficial to both operators and affiliates. This model has been credited as one of the primary reasons why ransomware attacks have proliferated rapidly both in and outside the pandemic [34]. Examples of this is Ryuk’s assumed successor Conti which USA’s CISA defines as RaaS [79]

Double extortion is an increasingly used tactic used by groups such as Ryuk, Conti and Netfilim to coerce victims into paying a random not just by encrypting files but by also threatening to publish sensitive data if the demand are not met, this human operated tactic is most successful on high-profile specific targets and with the increase in sensitive pharmaceutical [35,4] / research[9] information as well as new exploits into sensitive company information through insecure company devices it has been a tactic increasingly used by cyber criminals in recent years[19].




Figure 2 Timeline of notable attacks that involved double extortion in 2020 [21]

1. Literature Review

Even before the pandemic there has been a broad expansion in the role digital technologies have in society. Ranging from shopping, work and education it is safe to assume the vitality of these systems both for business as well as social interaction. It is not a surprise that cyber-crime has also expanded during this period. Latest reports [36] show that despite malware decreasing by 4%, ransomware has increased by 105% from 2020 to 2021 and a mind-blowing 231.7% from 2019. The regions of the UK and US were hit the hardest with ransomware volumes rising 227% (33.5 million) and 98% (421.5 million) respectively. This increase has also been seen with the cost of ransomware remediation, showing it rising from $0.76 million (USD) to $1.85 million (USD) [37] estimated to reach $20 billion by the end of 2021 [38]. This combined with the new environment caused by the pandemic provides excellent incentive for ransomware gangs to both continue and expand their tactics.

Ransomware and cyber-crime overall requires 3 factors for an attacker to commit a crime successfully: a victim, a motive, and an opportunity. The victim is the target of the attack, the motive is the reason for the criminal to attack and the opportunity is the chance for a crime to be committed. This model has been expanded further in criminology via the idea of Routine Activity Theory (RAT) [39, 40] to describe crimes, others have applied a game-theoretical model of kidnapping to ransomware [41, 42, 43].

These models reflect the fact that attacks have become more sophisticated compared to the early 2000’s, as well as much more targeted compared to a “spray and prey” technique. This is dependent on the attackers motivation whether financial, revenge or pure enjoyment. During the COVID-19 pandemic ransomware gangs have been quick to take opportunity of specific news and information leaks to attacks industries related to the pandemic. These opportunistic attacks select victims based on how vulnerable they are at one point. With the pandemic increasing the amount of misinformation, time constraints and panic the number of successful ransomware attacks has rose as victims are distracted by other impacts caused by the pandemic, this makes them more susceptible to be deceived by things they would not normally consider, furthermore once deceived they are more likely to make mistakes, panic and comply with the attackers demands then seek outside support due to the time constraints paces upon them along with other human factors, further emboldening attackers.

In addition industry factors also have an impact with companies now outsourcing a large amount of their technology to allow employees to work from home the security of these devices are reduced severely as they work outside of the company network and technicians no longer have easy access to perform maintenance and upgrades; something the victims may be less educated on. This has provided new avenues for attackers to mislead victims to falling prey to an attack. Other impacts include work pressure, personal changes, mental health conditions, medical issues, or events that cause a deep impact to society such as fatalities and catastrophes. In the past and present there have been several examples of ransomware gangs using notable events and exploits to maximise their gain, these examples include:

* **Healthcare attacks**: On the 12th May 2017 NHS hospitals were affected by the WannaCry ransomware attack [44]. This attack continued until the evening of the same day when a “kill-switch” was activated preventing further infection. With the partial cause of this being a specific Microsoft Windows vulnerability (none of the 80 NHS organisations affected by WannaCry has applied the advice March 14th 2021 Microsoft office patch to address this vulnerability) the cost of this vulnerability reached £92 million [45] and causes hundreds of surgeries to be cancelled. Recently there have been various healthcare attacks in COVID-19 research facilities such as the eResearch Technology [46] on October 5th that occurred slightly after announcements of 3rd stage clinical trials [47], a surge in COVID-19 deaths[48] and the announcement that US President Donald Trump and the first lady tested positive[49]
* **Infrastructure attacks**: Returning to May 7th 2021, Darkside gained entry to America’s largest fuel pipeline, Colonial Pipeline via a posted compromised password [10, 11]. This resulted not just in ~100GB being extracted and held at a $5 million ransom but a six-day outage causing fuel shortages and hoarding and panic set in. The majority of this ransom as later recovered and the attackers later apologised and disbanded [50]. Similar attacks occurred on the 27th June in Ukraine when NOTPENYA disrupted power distributors [52]. A monumental amount of attacks occurred including JBS foods halting meat processing in Australia [12], and fishing organisations such as NAFO [6]. All of these causing greater confusion, disruption, and panic to an already worried populace.
* **Education attacks**: Education has always been a key target for attackers with University College London being attacked in June 2017 [51] but with the new pandemic forcing online learning as well as increased vaccine research attacks in the education sector has increased significantly. Various K-12 schools have been hit including Toledo Public Schools on September 9th [7] and Baltimore Public Schools [8] halting online learning through infected links and forcing both of these schools to pay a ransom. Notable lockdowns have also lead to an increase in university/ research attacks such as the Netwalker attack on Columbia College Chicago on June 2nd where vital COVID-19 research was held hostage [5].
* **Finance and Technology attacks:** Finance and Technology have always been consistent ransomware targets due to the importance and amount of private information and the high reward. Cerber was a particular menace to Microsoft where it was discovered that it had infected more enterprise PC’s than any other ransomware family during 2016-2017 [53]. Two significant attacks that occurred during the pandemic was the Travelex attack that occurred 2nd January [1, 2] as information about the pandemic had begun to spread, this disrupted flights, stranding passengers and lead to the company going into administration [54]. The other attack is the Kaseya attack on July 2nd [13, 55]. This multi-chain attack by ReEvil through a fake software update was particularly malicious as over 1500 companies including Acer, and Coop use this software making them all vulnerable forcing mass shutdowns.

In response to these notable attacks several guidelines and recommendations have been published by various authorities to protect, prevent and mitigate these attacks [56, 22]. This is done to both strengthen existing systems as well as provide an education of ransomware and cyber-attacks as a whole. This paper aims to address the gap in ransomware research away from the vague notion of cyber-crime by defining a timeline of attacks to be able to identify key trends in order to strength thee industries for any future pandemic and to expand on the impact on citizens and the wider workforce.

1. Requirements and Planning

Whilst there have been numerous attempts in recent months to map and systematically analysis the evolution of cyber-crime during the pandemic [23]: few exist just for analysing ransomware. There lacks an ability to see a variety of distributed global attacks as seen in this manuscript. This is important as these incidents pose serious threats to the safety of both local and global economy including human lives, by sorting all attacks into their appropriate sectors and abstracting all unnecessary information into a set of understandable diagrams it provides an ability to see trends otherwise hidden and identify those related to the pandemic.

4.1 Initial Requirements

Before the completion of the dashboard and subsequent diagrams it was important for me to define the requirements and purpose of this paper and subsequent visuals. This was to ensure that the final graphs produces completed their tasks as clearly and efficiently as possible as well as ensure to increase overall efficiency. Overall this will ensure my final paper is as beneficial as possible to the research community.

The main requirement for this paper is to accurately and comprehensively display and analyse trends in ransomware during the COVID-19 pandemic. The purpose of this is to help further understand the significant role that ransomware had in COVID-19 cybercrime and how the societal and economic changes influenced the evolution of ransomware, something still not fully understood due to how new the subject is. By presenting a holistic view is allows greater reflection upon these changes and allows us to identify trends not possible earlier within the pandemic; This is useful for understanding the behaviour of cyber-criminal gangs, how technologically prepared we were for the pandemic, what sectors are most at risk, and what is required to be prepared for the next one.

Additionally this paper should provide clear and reflective narrative of a variety of ransomware attacks. The aim of this paper is to expand current research and provide a new perspective and effect of a specific cyber-crime during the COVID-19 pandemic, as a result it has to be understandable for a variety of education levels to be as helpful as possible. To achieve this I will keep this report short and concise as well as conform to standard cyber security vocabulary. Furthermore I have implemented the use of visuals to communicate clear trends in ransomware and the impact of various groups including sector, country as well as ransomware strains.

An important requirement of these visuals is that is needs to be able to map and present a large amount of attacks. This is because I knew from the beginning I would have a large number of attacks due to the global scale of my project, and thus I needed to decide the type of visual that would best present these result in a clear format. From this I decided a scatterplot would be the most ideal for my current level of programming skill. These would be supplemented by stacked bar charts and a choropleth map. These allow me to display hundreds of attacks completing my aim for a comprehensive report. These graphs have to be intelligible when presented to further support my analysis and increase its usability. Whilst there are no shortage of intelligent and create visuals to describe ransomware attacks my visuals aim to support my specific conclusions. For this I used D3.

* 1. Approach to Diagram Creation

This section is used to explain the methodology I used to gather information and create my visuals. Within this I will explain the nomenclature and search terms used to efficiently gather relevant COVID-19 data and ransomware attacks, which search materials were used, and the types of sources I chose to use/prioritise. Importantly I also discuss the limitations of my work at various stages.

* + 1. Nomenclature

There was an extremely large number of ransomware attacks during the COVID-19 pandemic over a wide range of sectors. During this the pandemic has been referred to with a variety of official names in the English speaking world including: Coronavirus, Covid19, COVID-19, 2019-nCoV, and SARS-CoV2. Throughout the paper I have used the term COVID-19 in order to ensure consistency which is reflected by the World Health Organisation [57]. However I have used all these variations during my search (predominately COVID-19) in order to ensure a wide search base and because the internet and some journals do not the same consistency. Ransomware has the same problem with variations including: ransom-ware, ransom attack, ransomware attack, ransomware virus. All of these have to be considered during research in order to find the highest number of attacks.

Below are some of the keywords used for searching for ransomware attacks during this phase. This allowed me to widen my reach and attributed to me finding 359+ notable attacks.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Pandemic keywords | Coronavirus, Covid19, COVID-19, 2019-nCoV, and SARS-CoV2 |
| Ransomware keywords | Ransomware, ransom-ware, ransom attack, ransomware attack, ransomware virus, cyber-attack |
| News outlet keywords | BBC, Kaspersky, News, Report, |
| Sector keywords | Education, K-12, COVID-19 Research, University, Hospital, Medical, Technology, Energy, Industry, Sector |

Table 1- Table of key terms used in ransomware attack research

* + 1. Construction of the Visuals

One initial discussion I had with Jason was the length of my COVID-19 timeline. This was important as by defining this early it provided me with a defined timeframe to focus my research on and thus allowed me to plan how long this research would take. It was decided that I would search for attacks within the 1st January 2020 – 31st August 2021 with the earliest attack being 2nd January 2020[1] and most recent the 26th August 2021[58]. This timeline includes the day the pandemic was officially declared, lockdowns in multiple countries as cases are reported, press releases regarding clinical trials and the release and adoption of the COVID-19 vaccines. The large timeline (18 months) meant that I was able to reach a sufficient number of attacks to fully represent the behaviour of ransomware attacks during this time, allowing me to be more confident in my conclusions.

Information in the table includes the country that the attack took place, the ransomware strain and group culpable (if known), the sector the victim was located in along with a small description of the attack. Finally the attack date and date of the article are also recorded. Each attack is attributed to an ID and reference number/URL for the article covering the attack. Due to its size, a subset of this information has been displayed in Table 2 which acts as a baseline for Figure 3.

Information displayed in the scatterplot includes the date of each attack along with the sector that was impacted. Additionally the scatterplot also shows the ransomware group responsible for the attack (if known) in order to see the behaviour and target preferences of these groups; otherwise the attack is coloured black. Moreover the scatterplot also displays a range of dates for notable COVID-19 dates including lockdowns for the UK, US, Spain, Italy, Germany, and France in addition to the three COVID-19 waves in the UK, announcement of phase-3 trials and the date of the initial vaccine rollout. These serve to provide key dates as well as to provide incentives for ransomware gangs to target specific victims. This information continues the entirety of the table.

In addition there are multiple smaller visuals such as stacked bar charts displaying all attacks per month by country, sector and ransomware strain respectively as well as a choropleth map displaying the number of attacks per country using a global visual format for better clarification. The structure of the table and visuals is described in further detail in Section 4.3.

This information has been collated using a multitude of sources offering reports of attacks. These sources include established news outlets such as the BBC, Reuters. New sources such as BleepingComputer provide detailed information regarding attacks due to their experience. Other sources include scientific journals, government and security reports, blogs, and articles. Additionally I used various existing lists of ransomware attacks such as Kaspersky and Blackfog to ensure that no notable attacks was missing from my table [59, 60, 61]. Normally blogs and articles would not be considered an academic source due to it being difficult to confirm their credibility however they frequently offer news on ransomware attacks before other sources. In addition common news outlets frequently choose not to show minor ransomware attacks or present them through a journalistic lens, distorting the facts to grab attention; a blog can show more information for attacks that are less well known. This is important as regardless of the level of publicity these attacks can still pose a tangible threat during COVID-19 and are needed to form a holistic view of ransomware attacks during this timeframe. The scatterplot and other visuals aim to achieve this.

**Search engines**: Due to my inexperience in research, only one search engine was used to create the table and subsequent visuals. This was Google[[1]](#footnote-1). This US-based engine was my choice due to my familiarity with the engine in addition to it dominating the search engine market not providing me with many other English speaking options. However additional Google services have been used including Google Scholar[[2]](#footnote-2) to find scientific papers and Google Translate[[3]](#footnote-3) to translate foreign websites into English for easier comprehension.

**Time Range:** I aimed to create a fully comprehensive timeline associated with the COVID-19 pandemic at that time. As a result I decided to start my timeline from January 1st 2020 and create the cut-off point not long before I started this project on August 31st 2021. This was to allow adequate time to research an admittedly large timeline as well as to allow time to develop the visuals and analysis findings.

**Exclusion Criteria:** Despite my extensive list of attacks, a number of ransomware attacks were excluded from the results. These included: **a)** attacks and sources behind a paywall or required account creation to obtain **b)** were unable to be confirmed or backed by a source **c)** could not be translated **d)** were duplicates of existing news reports. In addition attacks sources from engines other than Google were not used.

* + 1. Types of ransomware attacks

Ransomware, like cyber-crime, is composed of various different types. There are various taxonomies for the types of ransomware [62, 63] but they all mostly boil down to 5 main types: Crypto-ransomware, Lockerware, Scareware, Doxxware and RaaS. Al of these exploit victims for a specific purpose. However various attacks are not restricted to one type of ransomware and can encompass multiple types at once. Due to my inexperience with ransomware and time constraints I have decided to restrict my ransomware specification to Crypto-ransomware and Lockerware. More information regarding ransomware is seen in Section 2.

* + 1. Limitations of the table

The purpose of this section is to acknowledge the limitations during my research that could have skewed my results and prevented me from furthering my research.

One immediate limitation of the table is the fact that despite my best efforts it is likely that some attacks are not displayed in this table. This is due to some attacks being so obscure that my method was searching was unsuccessful and the limitations of a one person research team has. This can compromise the validity of my final conclusions. Secondly within Table 2 there are two columns called “Article Date” (date the article was published) and “Attack Date” (date the attack occurred).

Regarding “Article Date”, I acknowledge that in some cases information in these articles has been updated beyond me acquiring the information. Regarding “Attack Date”, despite me including the written attack date from each article, it is highly likely that this may not be wholly accurate as an attack may not become obvious until several days after it has been carried out. Table 2 has been ordered by “Attack Date” to provide a consistent chronological representation of events.

* + 1. Limitations of the visuals

The purpose of this section is to acknowledge the limitations during the creation of my visuals that could have skewed my results and prevented me from making more informative diagrams.

One personal limitation to the quality and clarity of my visuals is my experience in the programming language (D3.js). This being my first time using the language and the time constraints placed upon me the quality of the diagrams reflect this and could be more professional with more practice.

Furthermore despite the extensive list of ransomware attacks shown it is by no means an exhaustive list of attacks. These visuals do not show attacks that were unsuccessful or ones missed due to my time constraints, a lack of quality reporting or because these attacks did not affect the general public. In addition it also fails to show further details regarding the various ransomware groups (number of malicious attackers etc.). However there is enough data to clearly show a correlation between certain COVID-19 events and certain attacks and despite these limitations I have used all available resources to produce a relatively clear depiction of the ransomware landscape during the COVID-19 pandemic.

4.3 Diagrams and results

The aim of this section is to further examine all ransomware attacks, this will be done through a set of figures and tables. Figure 3 displays a details visual representation of a series of attacks during and induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. The scatterplot includes 359 global ransomware attacks during the set timeframe. These are colour-coordinated based on the attacker if known. It also highlights key lockdown dates for countries such as the UK, US, Italy, Spain, France, China as well as the timeframes for the UK’s three COVID-19 waves and the vaccine rollout date, it was limited to these countries to avoid an overload of information. These were validated as closely as possible with the WHO timeline of events to ensure an accurate representation.

Figure 3 indicates both direct and indirect correlation between announcements and incidents. Direct correlations are when criminals attack directly after or due to an announcement or threat. One possible example is the emergence of CryCryptor ransomware on the 26th June 2020 pretending to be COVID-19 tracing apps on Android [64] after the release of the real app on the 14th March 2020. However this correlation is not certain. Indirect correlation is when an incident is not directly related to an event. These are prevalent as ransomware was already on the rise before the pandemic and attacks will still continue regardless. However news events can still influence these decisions inadvertently causing a correlation. For example discussions of lockdown existed before China’s lockdown on the 16th January 2020 however travel company Travelex was attacked on the 2nd January 2020, before it was announced however the motive behind this attack is not concreate and in both cases more work needs to be done to confirm the intent behind these attacks.

Table 2 categorised a number of global ransomware attacks during the November 2020 period. Due to the size of the table only a snapshot is shown here and like the main table have been ordered by “Attack Date”. Within this table the target country and sector have been listed along with a brief description of the attack. It has been logged as to whether the attack aligns most with Crypto-ransomware or Lockerware as explained earlier. Finally each attack has a unique id for itself and the article attached to provide easy identification. Both the figure and table abstract detailed explanations of techniques and responses.

Table 3 contains the notable global COVID-19 dates shown on Figure 3. These to help find correlations between events and attacks and are uniquely coloured. They contain a “Start Date”, “End Date” and a brief description. This table is ordered by “Start Date”.




Figure 3 - Scatterplot timeline of ransomware attacks for each Sector during the COVID-19 pandemic




Figure 4- Legend for Ransomware Strains in Figure 3

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ID** | **Ref** | **Country** | **Ransomware Name** | **Ransomware Type** | **Sector** | **Description** | **Article Date** | **Attack Date** |
| **154** | **[156]** | **Italy** | **Ragnar Locker (?)** | **C** | **Other** | **Italian beverage giant Campari Group was the next big-name brand to suffer an attack. An investigation into the attack is ongoing and some researchers suspect the Ragnar Locker gang is responsible.** | **2020-11-10** | **2020-11-01** |
| **158** | **[160]** | **UK** | **Sodinokibi** | **C** | **Services** | **UK based housing association Flagship Group were forced to take their IT systems offline after the Sodinokibi ransomware strain entered the company via a phishing attack.** | **2020-11-24** | **2020-11-01** |
| **160** | **[162]** | **Germany** | **Mount Locker** | **C** | **Healthcare** | **Biomedical and clinical research company Miltenyi Biotec suffered a Mount Locker attack that affected the firm’s global IT infrastructure. The company’s 2,500 employees from 28 countries are working to develop cell research and therapy products for clinicians and researchers working on covid-19 vaccines.** | **2020-11-13** | **2020-11-01** |
| **153** | **[155]** | **Japan** | **Ragnar Locker** | **C** | **Technology** | **Japanese game developer Capcom fell victim to an attack at the hands of the Ragnar Locker gang who claimed to have stolen 1TB of sensitive data from their corporate networks in the US, Japan, and Canada. The ransom note included screenshots of stolen files, including employee termination agreements, passports, sales reports and bank statements.** | **2020-11-05** | **2020-11-02** |
| **155** | **[157]** | **Brazil** | **RansomExx (?)** | **C** | **Government** | **Massive ransomware attack that affected the cyberinfrastructure of the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (STJ). The ransomware operators behind the attack claimed that the entire STJ database has been encrypted and any attempt to restore the files would be in vain.** | **2020-11-06** | **2020-11-03** |
| **165** | **[167]** | **Australia** | **ReEvil** | **C** | **Finance** | **Nexia Australia and New Zealand, a network of solutions-focused accountancy and consultancy firms were next to disclose that they had been hit by ReEvil ransomware. The attackers claimed to have stolen 76GB of data during the incident, however, Nexia denied this and said that the incident was swiftly dealt with by their IT providers and there was no evidence of any movement of data or files.** | **2020-11-16** | **2020-11-03** |
| **157** | **[159]** | **Taiwan** | **DopplePaymer** | **C** | **Technology** | **Taiwanese electronics giant Compal, was next to make the ransomware headlines. The company who builds laptops for some of the world’s largest computer brands suffered an attack at the hands of the DoppelPaymer gang. The attack is said to have impacted around 30% of Compal’s computer fleet.** | **2020-11-09** | **2020-11-06** |
| **159** | **[161]** | **US** | **?** | **C** | **Healthcare** | **Iowa based medical billing company Timberline Billing Service LLC is boosting its cybersecurity after an unknown attack encrypted files and exfiltrated data earlier in the year.** | **2020-11-11** | **2020-11-10** |
| **162** | **[164]** | **Chile** | **Egergor** | **C** | **Retail** | **Chilean-based multinational Retail giant Cencosud was hit by an Egregor Ransomware attack that impacted Services across its stores** | **2020-11-14** | **2020-11-13** |
| **176** | **[2]** | **US** | **Ryuk** | **C** | **Education** | **Ryuk Ransomware attack on K-12 schools to avoid data leak** | **2020-12-02** | **2020-11-15** |
| **161** | **[163]** | **US** | **?** | **C** | **Healthcare** | **Americold, which is a cold storage giant responsible for providing storage for the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.** | **2020-11-16** | **2020-11-16** |
| **164** | **[166]** | **US** | **?** | **C** | **Services** | **Lehigh Valley Library in Pennsylvania was forced to close after falling victim to an attack. Affected servers were taken offline and the library remained closed while the attack was investigated and systems were restored.** | **2020-11-17** | **2020-11-16** |
| **166** | **[168]** | **US** | **?** | **C** | **Government** | **Government attack is next, this time it’s Jackson County in Oregon. The attack downed the countyï¿½s website following the recent ransomware attack on their web-hosting service provider, Managed.com** | **2020-11-19** | **2020-11-16** |
| **174** | **[176]** | **US** | **?** | **C** | **Education** | **Baltimore Public Schools was forced to cancel online learning for its 115,000 students after a ransomware affected its systems** | **2020-11-29** | **2020-11-16** |
| **168** | **[170]** | **UK** | **?** | **C** | **Other** | **Manchester United Football Club made serious headlines this month when it was revealed that they had suffered a cyberattack. Later confirmed to be ransomware, the club disclosed that although the attack was sophisticated, they had extensive protocols and procedures in place for such an event and they were prepared** | **2020-11-26** | **2020-11-20** |
| **173** | **[175]** | **US** | **DopplePaymer** | **C** | **Government** | **Delaware County in Pennsylvania were the next reported victim of the DoppelPaymer gang. Systems were taken offline while the organization worked with computer forensic specialists to determine the nature and scope of the event.** | **2020-11-29** | **2020-11-20** |
| **172** | **[174]** | **US** | **Conti** | **C** | **Technology** | **Advantech, the industrial automation and IoT chip maker confirmed that a ransomware attack that hit its network and that company data had been exfiltrated. The attack was carried out by the Conti ransomware gang who demanded a $14 million ransom to decrypt the affected systems and to stop leaking stolen company data.** | **2020-11-30** | **2020-11-21** |
| **167** | **[169]** | **South Korea** | **?** | **C** | **Retail** | **South Korean fashion and Retail company E-Land was forced to shut down 23 of its 50 branches following a ransomware attack** | **2020-11-22** | **2020-11-22** |
| **169** | **[171]** | **Australia** | **Netwalker** | **C** | **Services** | **Law In Order, an Australian supplier of document and digital Services to law firms. The company were victims of the Netwalker ransomware gang.** | **2020-12-03** | **2020-11-22** |
| **170** | **[172]** | **Denmark** | **?** | **C** | **Education** | **Ritzau, the largest independent news agency in Denmark responsible for delivering news to virtually all major media in in the country, had their editorial systems shut down following a ransomware attack. In a statement they confirmed that they did not intend to pay the ransom.** | **2020-11-25** | **2020-11-24** |
| **179** | **[180]** | **Brazil** | **RansomExx** | **C** | **Manufacturing** | **Brazilian aerospace giant Embraer reported that they had been a victim of ransomware. The company chose to restore its affected systems and refused to negotiate with the attackers which promoted the RansomExx gang to leak some company data.** | **2020-12-07** | **2020-11-25** |
| **175** | **[177]** | **Netherlands** | **?** | **C** | **Other** | **Endemol Shine, the global production company behind television shows such as Big Brother, MasterChef, and The Voice. The company has disclosed that they have reason to believe personal employee data and commercially sensitive information may have been compromised. The attack is claimed by DopplePaymer** | **2020-11-29** | **2020-11-26** |
| **183** | **[184]** | **Mexico** | **DopplePaymer** | **C** | **Technology** | **Electronics giant Foxconn suffered a ransomware attack at a Mexican facility during the Thanksgiving break. Following the attack the DoppelPaymer ransomware gang published files belonging to Foxconn NA on their ransomware data leak site.** | **2020-12-07** | **2020-11-28** |

Table 2- Table of ransomware attacks during November 2020

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Start Date | End Date | Description |
| 2020-01-06 | 2020-01-06 | China's 1st Lockdown |
| 2020-03-01 | 2020-05-31 | First COVID-19 Wave (UK) |
| 2020-03-13 | 2020-09-14 | US Quarantine and Tourist Screening |
| 2020-03-17 | 2020-03-17 | France Lockdown |
| 2020-03-18 | 2020-03-18 | Spain Lockdown |
| 2020-03-20 | 2020-03-20 | Germany Lockdown |
| 2020-03-23 | 2020-07-04 | UK's 1st Lockdown |
| 2020-09-03 | 2020-09-03 | Italy Lockdown |
| 2020-09-08 | 2020-09-21 | Announcement of phase 3 trials by leading vaccine producers |
| 2020-09-11 | 2020-12-01 | Second Wave (UK) |
| 2020-12-08 | 2020-12-08 | First vaccine rollout in UK |
| 2021-01-01 | 2021-04-31 | Third Wave (UK) |
| 2021-01-05 | 2021-03-28 | UK's 3rd Lockdown |
| 2020-11-05 | 2020-12-02 | UK's 2nd Lockdown |

Table 3- Colour-coordinated table showing notable COVID-19 dates shown on Figure 3 (shaded rectangles)

1. Analysis and Discussion

5.1 Tables and Graphs

The scatterplot shown in Figure 2 provides us with a good platform find trends and analyse the ransomware attacks that have occurred during the pandemic. From the 1st January 2020 and especially during noticeable COVID-19 dates it is clear that ransomware attack frequency increased significantly.

The 359 ransomware attacks presenting in Figure 3 are categorised as followed:

* 59 (16.43%) in Healthcare
* 54 (15.04%) in Technology
* 48 (13.37%) in Education
* 40 (8.71%) in Government
* 23 (6.41%) in Manufacturing
* 19 (5.29%) in Finance
* 19 (5.29%) in Retail
* 16 (4.46%) in Services
* 14 (3.90%) in Logistics
* 6 (1.67%) in Transport
* 3 (0.84%) in Utilities
* 58 (16.16%) in Other

This analysis is useful as it directly allows me to see the most targeted sectors during this timeframe. One immediate insight is the high number of attacks on the healthcare industry. This is expected as it is arguably one of the most important and most vulnerable component of a country’s critical infrastructure at this time. These attacks have occurred globally including the UK [65], US [66], Czech Republic [67], Canada [68], France [69], and Germany [70] with various gangs including Netwalker, Egregor and Ryuk. These attacks fit the modus operandi of these groups if we assume their aim is to maliciously target specific sectors to capitalise on the current chaos. In this case they believe that health organisations are more likely to pay the ransom to both avoid the loss of human life and to ensure that valuable COVID-19 research data is not lost or delayed; something vital to prevent further loss of life. In addition with increased patient numbers and longer working hours causing immense amount of stress employees are increasingly likely to miss signs of a malicious attack (i.e. an email) and less likely to notice an attack occurring thus causing further damage; something ransomware gangs are likely aware of and are keen to exploit. Inconsistent security standards/patches and outdated systems particularly in the UK exacerbate this issue.

Notably there have been promises from ransomware gangs that they will not target healthcare services during this time including statements from the operators of CLOP, DopplePaymer, Maze and Netfilim [21]. However there have been instances of these gangs accidently or otherwise attacking these services regardless [71]. One considers if this was a tactic to reduce security.

Education has also seen a significant increase in attacks as well resulting in numerous schools closing despite lessons already being interrupted due to the pandemic. These attacks have also spread globally to Germany [72], UK [73], and Netherlands [74] but predominately have been focused on the US with 67% of all education attacks correlated being in the US. Attackers include Netwalker, Clop and ReEvil. Education fits the modus operandi of ransomware gangs due to the large amount of sensitive information; frequently regarding young children. This increase in attacks could be due to the new exploits formed through the introduction of online learning in addition to poorly maintained cyber security. Schools are more likely to pay a ransom to avoid sensitive information being released and to reduce disruption to learning. In addition universities also saw attacks throughout the pandemic, whilst it’s debatable as to whether this is an increase from pre-pandemic it is still important to note the value of research material especially COVID-19 research which ransomware gangs see the value in and aim to disrupt.



Other industries such as Technology and Government have also has a substantial number of attacks. Despite having a larger number of attacks compared to pre-pandemic it is difficult to determine whether this increase is due to the natural increase in ransomware attacks from 2019-2021 or directly because of the pandemic. These sectors have consistently fulfilled the criteria for ransomware groups (sensitive information, ability to pay high ransom etc.). However it is important to consider the effect the pandemic on the motives and methods of attack. With many companies becoming remote it has led to new vulnerabilities in computer security as company property is connected to unverified networks across the country, technicians unable to perform mandatory security patches and the increased integration and reliance on proprietary software (e.g. Zoom, Slack, Google Meet) as well as non-verbal forms of communication such as email increases the probability of an employee making a mistake or attackers finding an security vulnerability as they trust the security of the company they work for. COVID-19 inspired ransomware attacks has leveraged government backed announcements to exploit the uncertainty and anxiety of society to seek financial profit.

Figure 5 - Ransomware attacks each month (Categorised by Sector)

Figure 5 shows the distribution of attacks per month, this is further categorised by sector. Initial analysis shows an increase in attacks from May 2020, a sharp increase from September 2020 to October 2020 after which there is a slight decrease till the end of the timeline, still above initial levels.

One noticeable trend is the sharp increase of attacks during September-October 2020 period with 33 and 31 attacks respectively totalling up to 18% of all recorded attacks. These numbers seem to correlate with John Hopkins University stating COVID-19 cases had reached 40 million [75, 76], emergence of the Delta variant and announcements of third stage vaccines trials. Figure 3 further supports these findings. This information combined with the strengthening of lockdowns may be the cause as to why the number of attacks on healthcare was the largest during the timeframe at 7 (23% of attacks in September) and 8 (24% of attacks in October) respectively as ransomware gangs use this news to take advantage of the chaos and increased to target the healthcare industry.

Furthermore it is also important to note the increased number of attacks on education during September 2020 (9 or 29%) and March 2021 (7 or 32%) making it the highest attacked sector in these months. With COVID-19 cases rising during this time schools has switched to online learning and thus required new technologies to function remotely. These new technologies combined with the extra stress on both teaching and admin staff increases the chance of an attack occurring unnoticed. This combined with the initial stress and discord of the start of term provides the perfect incentive for ransomware gangs to attack. The same is true for March with the return from half term.

3%

3%

9%

28%

47%




Figure 6 - Percentage of ransomware attacks per country

Figure 6 shows a summary of the main countries that were targets of a ransomware attack and the percentage of their total number of attacks this constitutes. As shown the US was the clear frontrunner with 167 total attacks; 47% of the total number of recorded attacks. This is expected due to the US being arguably the largest global superpower with a large percentage of identifiable global businesses being situated in the country. This notoriety would encourage attacks to occur. The attacks then spread to the UK where 34 attacks (9%) occurred before spreading to various other countries. It is important to mention the large diversity in countries that were attacked. With it counting for 28% of all recorded attacks 45 countries suffered at least one ransomware attack during the COVID-19 pandemic. If we follow the UN’s definition of 193 countries [77] 23% of countries have experienced a ransomware attack within this timeframe. It is clear from Table 3 that there is a diverse number of affected countries and that the US is the most targeted.

All but 4 ransomware recorded contained some form of crypto-ransomware. This makes sense logistically as the primary aim of ransomware gangs is to disrupt exploit their victims for information and money. New instances of ransomware that were discovered in this period such as *DarkSide* (August 2020), *Netfilim* (February 2020)*, Egregor* (September 2020)*,* and *AvosLocker* (June 2021)with the remaining attacks being pre-existing strains such as *ReEvil, Netwalker, Ryuk/Conti, Dharma-Crysis, Mespinoza/Pyza, DopplePaymer.* An example of use is *CXK-NMSL* and *Dharma-Crysis* ransomware being spread through COVID-19 themed emails [78].

Despite prolific gangs such as ReEvil and Wizard Spider (Ryuk/Conti) participating in notable attacks, one high profile attack was the Colonial Pipeline attack by DarkSide [10, 11]. DarkSide have publicly stated they prefer to target high-revenue large organisations in order to extract a large ransom [80] and typically gain access through phishing emails and exploiting remotely accessible accounts. They have also used Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to maintain Persistence. In this instance they used an exposed password to a Virtual Private Network (VPN) account and once they had access deployed ransomware to steal sensitive data. Despite receiving a ransom of $2.3 million most was later recovered and DarkSide later stopped all activities due to the backlash [81]; no further attacks were logged by them during this period.

On a larger scale whilst attacks increased in number, ransomware attacks per strain was relatively consistent through the COVID-19 pandemic. It is interesting to see the emergence and termination of the same strains such as DarkSide and Avaddon during this data period however it is unclear whether this is related, directly or indirectly, with the pandemic and would require further research. For a large number of attacks I was unable to find an attacker or one was not provided (176 or 49% of attacks do not have an attacker associated with it). One reason this may be is that simply the attacker is unknown or not affiliated with any particular gang, with the backlash cyber-attacks can have and the harsh criminal charges if caught, it is beneficial to not reveal your identity. In addition companies and news outlets may not feel comfortable releasing the attacker’s information due to impending investigations or for privacy.

5.2 Impact on workforce

As the pandemic continues more strains of ransomware are likely to emerge causing further harm both personally and on a wider societal scale with large sectors fully reliant on cyber tools [82]. The pandemic has had a profound effect on the world; the mass quarantine of citizens and staff, new mandates and rules, and the measures put in place to facilitate remote learning/working with the stress this places on existing cyber infrastructure. This stress threatens to affect the current lifestyle and the way people communicate today.

Traditional risk classification contains elements like asset valuation, threat frequency and vulnerability probability to determine the overall priority and risk an attack will have. With remote working looking to stay it is necessary to critically analyse the weaknesses to strengthen its resilience and security to it can be effective long term. It is increasingly important that the control of information (storage, processing, and transmission) has an elevated importance given the increases in long range communication and the increase of attacks on said infrastructure. This is also the case for weaponised COVID-19 or medical government frameworks [83]. Given the current climate if not dealt with it could lead to a decrease in trust for government controlled systems as public uncertainty increases. This may lead to a reluctance in voluntarily sharing private information related to their condition and location; something which in the long term hinders the ability to mitigate the viruses spread. There is also an implication in the processing of personal data. The General Data Protection Act (GDPR) [84] in the UK dictates that personal data must be kept only for its intended purpose and only for the time necessary. It also states that participants should always receive explicit, rapid and transparent information regarding the uses of their information.

Whilst research has shown that the acquisition and use of big data that includes identifiable information is extremely useful for epidemiological investigations [85], and in the case of COVID-19 it was vital to further understand the symptoms presented, and how it spread within local and global communities which in the long run will be useful in helping governments create plans to understand and mitigate current and future pandemics. It is important to note the challenges faced by the government in successfully confirming to these rules whilst ensuring rapid access and processing of enormous sums of PII data by different entities such as contact tracing. Legal and regulatory laws regarding data differ between countries and thus data is privy to different protections, this adds an additional layer of complexity when choosing to share COVID-19 data, making it more difficult as countries have to maintain their own regulations.

Impacts of this pandemic have been felt outside of computing. As countries try to reduce COVID-19 cases and enforce lockdowns it means that some sectors no longer receive the same level of income as before resulting in lower profits. Companies respond by decreasing their number of staff, increasing the unemployment level within a country. This creates a negative reinforcement cycle as with more people having less disposable income spending decreases, further increasing strain on the business sector resulting in more jobs being lost. Some may even turn to cyber-crime themselves to support themselves which will have implications for policing as they must ensure they have the capacity to deal with increased cyber-crime. In addition the increase in disposable time combined with the stifling restrictions of lockdown has led to a sharp increase of mental stress and diagnosis as their social and economic circumstances take a toll as many coping mechanisms are unavailable. There is a well-documented burden of mental health changes following disasters and previous viral outbreaks [86, 87] and thus it is not unusual that 56% of people a study in the UK were feeling stressed and anxious [88]. This increases places further stress on mental health and healthcare services which is already breaking under the current circumstances. The finance sector is also affected as the above exacerbates the predicted financial recession. This predicts a spiral for future economic downturn. Contrarily people have also used the pandemic to improve their employment and mental status. Coined the “Great Resignation” 47 million people voluntarily quit their jobs in America alone as workers find themselves with greater bargaining power or wishing to leave to better their own lifestyle with the economic freedom provided by the COVID-19 stimulus package [89]. However debate as to whether this economic trend was started or merely exacerbated by the pandemic is ongoing [90].

1. Conclusion and Possible Improvements/Future work

The effect and influence the COVID-19 pandemic has been historic and the societal, economical and even environmental changes are wholly unique; something that ransomware gangs have capitalised upon. Despite including all ransomware attacks, not just those directly related to the pandemic it is clear to see that there is a loose correlation between COVID-19 events and new announcements and the number of ransomware attack capitalising on the fear to attempt a successful attack.

Concluding my analysis, it is clear that the sectors of Healthcare, Education, Technology and Government were heavily affected by attacks with the months surrounding notable events such as lockdown receiving a slightly higher number of attacks, despite high numbers overall. I discussed the modus-operandi of ransomware gangs and explained how they usually gain access to a system through emails containing malware to plant ransomware, through RDP and compromised accounts and how the aim is to primarily disrupt and extort people for money (primarily in the form of online currency such as Bitcoin due to its anonymity and ability to use cryptocurrency tumbling services to decrease traceability [91]) and sensitive information with notable examples. RaaS and double extortion have also been briefly explained however future research would be needed to elaborate on the use and effectiveness of these methods. Further analysis on the influence governments and news outlets has been discussed along with an insight on how this pandemic has impacted cyber-security and more in the long term.

Despite research into the impact the pandemic has had on cyber-crime has been performed by my supervisor I believe this is one of the first times it has been specialised to focus on ransomware with a context of actual global live events. In addition it is rare to find such as wide timeline for this research due to how recent the current event are. However there is plenty of room for improvement as the current research can be best described as loose and indirectly correlated. It is also very difficult to make concreate connections due to the size of the dataset and number of affected countries, as a result some results had to be abstracted in the visuals. Further research should investigate my findings and outline whether a predictive model could prove this relationship. In the future I would like to extend the timeline to April 2022 in order to include new events in the pandemic such as the Booster Vaccine and the decrease in ReEvil activity. This would provide us with a more holistic view of the pandemic and subsequent ransomware attacks. Making the final analysis much more helpful. I also wish to spend more time on my visuals to make them more comprehensible and constructive. The aim is to collaborate with others performing similar research along with various codified examples of similar research to affirm this conclusion and publish it for the betterment of the scientific community.

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2. <https://scholar.google.com/> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
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